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ATTEMPTING TO ENGAGE IN SOCIALLY
COHERENT DIALOGUE ABOUT RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
BY ALAN BROWNSTEIN
INTRODUCTION
Most book reviews reflect the reviewer’s final conclusions
about the author’s finished work. This review is more of a
snapshot of the lengthy dialogue I have been engaged in for
several months with Nelson Tebbe, the author of the book being
reviewed. The symposium conference organized by the St. John’s
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development in September
2016, invited several church-state scholars to comment on a draft
manuscript of Nelson Tebbe’s forthcoming book, Religious
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age.1 However, the book was not fully
completed when this multi-participant dialogue began.
Nelson’s 2 manuscript was provocative and challenging. All
of the scholars who spoke at the conference offered positive and
critical commentary on his work. And, of course, Nelson was
given the opportunity to respond. That was the beginning of the
dialogue, but it certainly was not the end, at least it was not the
end for me. For several months after the symposium conference, I
have been exchanging e-mails with Nelson, challenging some
arguments in his book, seeking clarifications on other points, and
responding to the e-mails I received in reply. Nelson addresses
the comments of the reviewers in this symposium issue. I fully

1 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017) (hereafter
“TEBBE”).
2 I am going to refer to Professor Tebbe as Nelson throughout my review. I have
known him a long time. Further, because I consider this review to be part of an on-going
conversation, it would be artificial to formalize the discussion by referring to him as
Professor Tebbe or “Tebbe.”
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expect that his responses will open the door to as many new
issues as it resolves. It is an on-going conversation.
This review is also a temporary single point on a lengthy
dialogue because the topic of Nelson’s book, religious liberty and
equality in contemporary America, is in flux both as a matter of
law and of social reality as well. From a legal perspective, the
current constitutional framework is uncertain. For example, the
most recent Supreme Court religion clause decision, Town of
Greece v. Galloway,3 is divorced both from prior language in the
Court’s jurisprudence and any plausible understanding of social
reality.4
If new Supreme Court Justices committed to originalism
are appointed and confirmed over the next four years, it is not
clear what the repercussions will be for church-state doctrine.
Justice Scalia, a self-proclaimed originalist, after all, was the
author of the Court’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,5
the case which effectively gutted the Free Exercise Clause. Post
Smith, there is considerable debate about whether the Smith
decision can be grounded in the original understanding of the
First Amendment.6 Further, any new originalist Justice who is
actually committed to grounding his or her decisions on the
historical understanding, instead of using originalism to mask
what are essentially ideologically determined constitutional
interpretations, will find that adjudicating church-state disputes
is a difficult undertaking.7

3 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014).
4 See Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia: The Supreme Court’s Blindness to

Religious Liberty and Religious Equality Values in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 48 Loyola
of L.A. L. Rev. 371, 396-407 (2014) [hereinafter Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia].
5 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990).
6 Compare Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1461—62, 1513 (1990) (arguing that
constitutionally mandated religious exemptions are
consistent with the original
understanding of the First Amendment), with Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional
Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 948
(1992) (contending that “In eighteenth-century America, where varied Christian sects
bickered with one another and thrived, a constitutional right to have different civil
obligations on account of religious differences was precisely what dissenters did not
demand.”).
7 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides a Weak
Foundation for Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Relating to Religion, CARDOZO L.
REV. 196, 196—97 (2009) [hereinafter Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides
a Weak Foundation].
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As a matter of social reality, the role of religion in public
life and its relationship to government and the community is
shifting and uncertain as well. There is a marked increase in
Americans who are not affiliated with organized religions.8
Attitudes toward Islam are challenging any consensus
commitment to religious neutrality.9 With the doctrinal and
social sand shifting so unpredictably with political winds, it is
hard to write or say anything today with the sense that it will be
valid or even meaningful tomorrow.
So this review is written on a floating log in fast moving
flood waters that are altering the law and society river’s past
path and boundaries. As such, it is much more an essay about
ideas and proposals than an article based on case law and
particular factual foundations. Therefore, I have included only
the barest minimum of footnotes, many of which are to
arguments and ideas discussed in my own work.10 That approach
resonates not only with our uncertain world, but also with the
central arguments and thesis of Nelson’s book. Religious
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is a book of arguments and ideas,
grounded in normative reasoning as much as it is in conventional
legal doctrine.

8 See, e.g., Robert P. Jones et al., Exodus: Why Americans are Leaving Religion – and
Why They’re Unlikely to Come Back, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://www.prri.org/research/prri-rns-poll-nones-atheist-leaving-religion/; “Nones” on the
Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 9. 2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/; Alan Cooperman, et al., U.S.
Public Becoming Less Religious: Modest Drop in Overall Rates of Belief and Practice, but
Religiously Affiliated Americans Are as Observant as Before, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/.
9 See Rachel Zoll & Emily Swanson, AP-NORC Poll: Christian-Muslim split on
religious freedom, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS – NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (Dec. 30,
2015),
http://apnorc.org/news-media/Pages/News+Media/AP-NORC-Poll-ChristianMuslim-split-on-religious-freedom.aspx; How Americans Feel About Religious Groups,
PEW RES. CTR. (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/2014/07/16/how-americans-feel-aboutreligious-groups/; Controversies Over Mosques and Islamic Centers Across the U.S., THE
PEW
F.
ON
RELIGION
&
PUB.
LIFE
(2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/09/27/controversies-over
mosques-and-islamic-centersacross-the-u-s-2/; see generally Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious
Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV.
231 (2012); see James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of
Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717 (2015).
10 Because much of this review contrasts my own views on church-state issues with
Nelson’s analysis, a significant number of citations are to my own work.
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I. SOCIAL COHERENCE
Each of the commentators at the St John’s symposium was
assigned particular chapters of Nelson’s book to focus on in
drafting their remarks for the conference. I was assigned the
chapters on freedom of association11 and employment
discrimination.12 I will discuss these chapters later on in this
review. It is difficult, however, to discuss particular topics
discussed in the book without addressing the larger project and
focusing on key principles which are recurring themes in
Nelson’s analysis. Accordingly, this review will be substantially
more expansive than an essay limited exclusively to my assigned
chapters. And the logical place to begin this broader discussion is
the method for thinking about liberty, equality and rights on
which Nelson grounds his analysis – what he describes as social
coherence.13
Nelson does not provide us with a short hand, one sentence
definition of his social coherence methodology. The core idea is
that reasoning about liberty and rights is legitimate and
defensible against claims that it is as hoc and intrinsically
irrational if it demonstrates coherence. That is, an analysis is not
completely arbitrary and conclusory if it is tied together to a
range of existing judgements about concrete cases and the
principles that are derived from them that a person accepts as
collectively accurate.14 That is the coherence part of the
methodology.
The social dimension of the methodology arises from the
inevitable reality that the interconnected judgments on which an
individual bases new conclusions are grounded in the individual’s
social and political identity. Social coherence unabashedly
recognizes that our coherent judgments are necessarily
contingent on our social location.15 It is not enough, however, for
an individual to demonstrate self-awareness of his or her
understanding of social reality. That understanding must be
sufficiently shared to make arguments accessible and potentially
11
12
13
14
15

TEBBE, supra note 1, at 80—97 (2017).
Id. at 142—163.
Id. at 8—11, 25–36.
Id. at 8—9.
Id. at 31.
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persuasive to others. If we are talking about legal arguments, the
legal equivalent of shared social reality involves some recognition
of broadly accepted legal principles and constitutional doctrine.
I do not have a serious problem with social coherence as a
way to approach difficult legal problems relating to religious
liberty and equality. I would probably describe the concept a bit
differently, but it seems to me that what Nelson identifies as a
social coherence approach to problem solving describes what a lot
of reasonable legal scholars including constitutional law
professors generally do when we write articles and books. Most of
us are not philosophers. We start with concrete situations that
provide an accepted foundation for our arguments. We reason by
analogy. But we do not reason in static isolation. We recognize
that conditions, norms, and laws change. We consider the
collective experience of the American society and legal system in
developing arguments. We recognize that law – including
constitutional law – requires a connection to the community, to
the polity, to the people. Our arguments have to do more than
make sense to us. They have to reflect a shared understanding of
law and social reality. This is social coherence or at least a form
of social coherence.
Thus, our arguments reflect our understanding of common
sense morality. They try to resonate with uncontroverted or at
least generally accepted long term principles of American
constitutionalism. We can argue for sharp departures from
accepted understandings, but when we do so we have to work
harder to defend our positions as reasonable legal arguments. In
law, advocates of sharp changes in doctrine bear a heavier
burden of persuasion than advocates for continuity or
incremental change.
Of course, law, even constitutional law, does involve
experiments that may not seem socially coherent when they are
first asserted. Here, I would suggest the reasonableness of the
argument depends in part on the recognized inadequacy of
accepted legal understandings. Perhaps more importantly, the
test of time will determine whether these new experimental ideas
eventually become part of the accepted wisdom. Social coherence
in legal analysis has to include the possibility that the
unreasonable may become reasonable and the reasonable may
become unreasonable over time.
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So social coherence makes some sense to me at least for the
level of discourse at which many legal scholars operate.
Certainly, for the purposes of this review, I accept it as an
operational methodology for argument. It is a relatively neutral
foundation for a substantive discussion of religious liberty and
equality issues.
II. THE UNSTABLE AND SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS OF
CHURCHSTATE RELATIONSHIPS
Nelson’s general approach to addressing religious liberty
issues in his book is to focus on concrete areas of agreement
about religious liberty, freedom of association, equality of status
and treatment from which principles can be derived and by
analogy to which disputes can be resolved. There is a
foundational framework that underlies much of his analysis,
however, that is accepted but not fully described. I had a difficult
time understanding some of Nelson’s arguments until I
understood the framework he was accepting. In social coherence
terms, I needed to know the location in law and social
understandings of Nelson’s analysis. Accordingly, let me sketch
out briefly, and far too summarily, where I think the foundation
of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is situated in the
shifting sands of American church-state jurisprudence.
Put simply, and I mean very simply,16 I suggest that there
are three macro, arguably socially coherent, understandings of
the religion clauses and church-state doctrine. The first
understanding, and this is the approach that I support and
endorse, considers religion to be distinct both for constitutional
purposes and in terms of social reality. With regard to social
reality, this model for evaluating church-state issues recognizes
that religion plays a role in the lives of religiously devout
16 These three models are generic categories that do not pretend to capture the range
of perspectives on church-state issues in the case law and commentary. I am well aware,
for example, that some scholars who support the neutral allocation of funds to both
religious and secular grantees for educational and social welfare programs do not support
government sponsored religious displays or prayers that endorse religion or specific
religions. Dramatically oversimplified as they are, however, I think these models reflect
core differences that will help readers to locate and understand the arguments presented
in Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age. At a minimum, they were useful to me in
thinking about Nelson’s book.
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individuals that is existentially and experientially distinct from
the beliefs and identity of non-religious individuals. For the
purposes of the model, this is more of a descriptive, than a
normative conclusion.
For constitutional purposes, part of the distinctive nature
of religion-state relationships is that they implicate multiple
constitutional values including personal liberty and autonomy,
equality of status and treatment among groups, freedom of
speech, and the need to avoid the centralizing of power.
Accordingly, this model attempts to promote the core values of
religious liberty and religious equality. It also tries to minimize
distorting the marketplace of ideas in favor of or against religious
beliefs, ideas, and speech. Further, it attempts to decentralize
power by avoiding too close a relationship between church and
state.17
Generally speaking, this analysis suggests that these
multiple goals are best accomplished by defining both religion
clauses expansively and enforcing them with some rigor. Indeed,
for ease of discussion, we may refer to this approach as the
Rigorous Religion Clause model. Thus, laws that substantially
burden the exercise of religion must be justified under some form
of meaningful review.18 Serious constitutional constraints are
imposed on government subsidies of religious institutions and
activities. Publicly sponsored prayers and religious displays
endorsing religion are also restricted.
This model recognizes that while there are significant
tensions between free exercise and establishment clauses values,
in many ways the two clauses and the values they promote work

17 I have spent the last 25 years writing about this understanding of the religion
clauses. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres:
The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution,
51 OHIO ST. L. J. 89 (1990) [hereinafter Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and
Earthly Spheres]; Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and
Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J. OF L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243 (1999) [hereinafter
Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses]; ALAN BROWNSTEIN, THE SOUTER DISSENT:
CORRECT BUT INADEQUATE IN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS DEBATING NEUTRALITY
(Stephen W. Monsma, ed.) 151 (2002) [hereinafter BROWNSTEIN, The Souter Dissent].
18 The applicability and nature of that review may be nuanced and complicated. See
e.g., Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 51 CASE WESTERN RES. L.
REV. 55 (2006) [hereinafter Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously].
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to reinforce each other.19 This last point is of particular
importance. There is a constitutional and political balance to this
understanding of church-state relationships. Under this
understanding, government is limited in its ability to interfere
with religion and to promote religion.20 Further, constituencies
seeking to protect religious liberty against the imposition of
government burdens on religious belief and practice as well as
those attempting to prevent the use of government resources and
power to favor religion over the non-religious, or majority faiths
over minority religions, all see some value in treating religion as
distinct for legal and constitutional purposes.21
The framework or model described above requires some
arbitrary line drawing. More problematically, at a micro level, it
results in some individuals and groups incurring costs or harms
and experiencing some arguable unfairness. Those costs and
perceived unfairness are balanced to some extent and justified
more generally as the price that must be paid to achieve the
model’s multiple goals.
I think this Rigorous Religion Clause model was clearly a
socially coherent view during relatively recent constitutional
history. It should sound somewhat familiar. In general terms, it
was the understanding of church-state doctrine accepted by the
courts during the 1960’s and 1970’s and in many ways reflects
much of the case law of the Warren and Burger Courts.
A great deal has changed over the last thirty to thirty-five
years, however. The utility of the Free Exercise Clause to protect
religious freedom has substantially diminished. According to the
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, the Free
Exercise Clause standing alone provides virtually no protection
to religious individuals or institutions against neutral laws of
general applicability.22 The central reasoning of this decision is
that for constitutional purposes, it is permissible for the state to

19 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing
Mandates: Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause are Stronger When Both Clauses are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1701 (2011) [hereinafter Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually
Reinforcing Mandates].
20 Id. at 1716—17.
21 Id. at 1720—21.
22 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
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treat religious exercise as if it is no different than secular
practices. Indeed, along as the state does so, and subjects both
religious and secular conduct to the same regulatory regime, the
free exercise clause imposes no limit on state action. The Smith
decision explains why so many current church-state disputes
involve the adjudication of religious liberty statutes or
controversies about the enactment of such laws.23 Today, federal
constitutional protection of religious liberty rarely gets on the
legal playing field.
The scope and rigor of the Establishment Clause has also
been sharply reduced. Constraints on government funding of
religious institutions have been substantially weakened.24 Most
importantly, they have been reduced if not eliminated under a
“neutrality theory” that challenges the idea that religious and
secular institutions should be treated differently for funding
purposes.25 Indeed, proponents of this approach draw strong
analogies between free speech doctrine and religion clause
doctrine.26 Under this perspective the Court’s analysis in
Rosenberger v. Rectors of the University of Virginia,27 a case
invalidating on free speech grounds a public university’s
discriminatory refusal to fund a student group’s religious
periodical while funding similar secular student expressive
activities, is to be interpreted and applied as broadly as

23 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)
(adjudicating religious liberty claim under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act).
24 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 643-644 (2002). The Court has also reinterpreted standing requirements to
make it increasingly difficult to bring Establishment Clause challenges to federal court
for adjudication on the merits. See Steven K. Green, The Slow, Tragic Demise of Standing
in Establishment Clause Challenges, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. AND POL’Y (Sept. 2011),
available at https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Green_-_Establishment_Clause.pdf;
I.C. Lupu and R.W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115, 119
(2008).
25 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with
Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L. J. 1, 20—21 (1997); Michael
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 134 (1992); See
generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA (ed.), CHURCH-STATE RELIGIONS IN CRISIS: DEBATING
NEUTRALITY (2002).
26 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 25, at 20; MONSMA, supra note 25, at 6—7.
27 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).
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possible.28 Indeed, the basic idea that government may even
exercise discretion to discriminate between secular and religious
institutions and programs in awarding subsidies and grants is
challenged.29
There has also been a significant retreat from prior case
law limiting government’s ability to promote religious ideas and
messages. Town of Greece is only the most recent and most
egregious of these decisions.30 Basically, the Establishment
Clause side of the church-state package I described in the first
model has broken apart. Here again, free speech doctrine is often
employed to justify the state facilitated expression of
majoritarian religious messages and displays.31
Given the repudiation and fracturing of the Rigorous
Religion Clause model, one may reasonably wonder exactly what
is left of a socially coherent understanding of church-state
relationships. I think the current answer is that there are two
opposing perspectives that are being debated explicitly or
implicitly. We can call one approach the One-sided Neutrality
Model.32 This approach accepts “neutrality theory” and at least
an implicit free speech framework for government funding of
28 Thus, for example, in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720, 724, n.3 (2004) a case in
which the Court upheld state constitutional restrictions that prevented a scholarship
recipient from using public funds to pursue a degree in devotional theology, plaintiff
argued that Rosenberger controlled the case and demonstrated that the state’s restriction
on public aid for religious purposes violated the free speech clause of the First
Amendment.
29 See, e.g., Id. at 725; see also Brief for Petitioner at *26, *27, Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, Brief for Petitioner, 136 S. Ct. 891 (8th Cir. 2016) (No.
15-577) (arguing that it is unconstitutional for state to exclude religious daycares and
preschools from government grant program). The Supreme Court accepted Petitioner’s
argument, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017)
30 See Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia, supra note 4, at 398.
31 See, e.g., Matthews, on behalf of M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416,
421 (Tex. 2016); Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Establishment Clause
and the Free Speech Clause in the Context of the Texas High School Cheerleader Religious
Banner Dispute, JUSTIA, (Nov. 9, 2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012/11/09/theestablishment-clause-and-the-free-speech-clause-in-the-context-of-the-texas-high-schoolcheerleader-religious-banner-dispute; Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious
Expression at High School Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society,
NEXUS, 5 Nexus 61, 66—67 (2000).
32 The one-sided nature of this model is occasionally conceded by its proponents. See,
e.g., Esbeck, supra note 25, at 27 (acknowledging that “it would be rhetorical, but still a
fair comment, to say that in neutrality theory religion gets the best of both worlds:
religion is free of burdens borne by others but shares equally in the benefits.”); see also
Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 17, at 246—56 (criticizing the
one-sided, non-neutral nature of neutrality theory).
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religious institutions and activities. Government may subsidize
religion under any funding scheme that allocates resources
according to neutral, secular criteria. Indeed, religious and
secular grantees – either individual or institutional – are so
similarly situated that it would be unconstitutional for the state
to decline to subsidize religious institutions and activities when it
is providing financial support to secular grantees or beneficiaries.
The One-sided Neutrality Model also supports government
endorsement of religion through state sponsored messages and
displays, just as government can endorse secular messages at its
discretion.33 But proponents of this approach continue to insist
that religion is distinctive as a matter of social reality and that
religious
liberty
deserves
distinctive
and
significant
constitutional or statutory protection, even when providing this
protection imposes harm on third parties.
The other emerging approach, let’s call it the “Limited
Liberty, Egalitarian Model” accepts the demise of Establishment
Clause values to a considerable extent, particularly with regard
to government funding of religion. But it also rejects the idea
that religion is all that distinctive as a matter of social reality or
that it should generally be thought to warrant special legal
treatment.34 From this perspective, the foundation of “neutrality
theory” underlying recent cases is more or less correct, but it
can’t be isolated. It requires more than equal treatment between
religious and secular recipients of government aid. It also
requires in many cases the generalizing of the protection
provided to religious conscience and religious associations.
I think Nelson’s book is a thoughtful, searching attempt to
demonstrate that one of these two current competing approaches
is more socially coherent and provides for better church-state
relationships in our society. His analysis is grounded fairly firmly
in the emerging Limited Liberty, Egalitarian Model. His support
33 I recognize that there are church-state scholars who support a neutrality model for
government funding, but also reject the government endorsement of religion through
state sponsored prayer and religious displays. The three models I discuss are far too
limited to describe the broad range of church-state perspectives that are presented in the
academic literature or in social dialogue. Nonetheless, I think they capture core paradigm
positions that reflect central, socially coherent disagreements about church-state
relationships.
34 See generally, Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1351 (2013).
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for this model is hardly unjustified. The alternative approach,
the One-sided Neutrality Model, has lots of problems.
The One-sided Neutrality Model is arguably internally
incoherent because the lack of a distinction between the religion
and the secular in neutrality theory and the analogy to free
speech doctrine in funding cases seem inconsistent with the idea
that religion deserves special protection and should receive
special exemptions from regulations – when neither protection or
exemptions are available to non-religious individuals and
institutions. Further, the costs and harms and perceived
unfairness of protecting religion alone can’t be balanced against
or justified by a comprehensive church-state framework
promoting multiple values. The One-sided Neutrality Model is
much more limited and well, one-sided, in the values it protects
and promotes. Also, because this model supports expansive
government funding of religious organizations, it undermines the
persuasive force of claims to religious autonomy. It is much more
difficult to justify independence from government control when
an institution or program is funded by the state to serve public
purposes.
I do not suggest that the One-sided Neutrality Model is
indefensible or that it lacks support in the polity and in law.
There is more than enough residual grounding in law and culture
to make this perspective socially coherent if not persuasive. But
that after all is the reason for Nelson’s book. He sees the need to
challenge the One-sided Neutrality model and to provide a more
socially coherent and persuasive alternative to it.
As a general matter, I believe the One-sided Neutrality
Model is vulnerable to many of Nelson’s arguments. In many
respects the model is hard to justify. From my perspective,
moving away from the Rigorous Religion Clause Model – the
approach I support – was a major mistake. I think from a
multiple values perspective, protecting distinctive free exercise
rights or expansive religious accommodations under a legal
regime without establishment clause constraints on the state
promotion of religion is difficult to defend.
This does not mean, however, that I agree with important,
even critical arguments presented in Religious Freedom in an
Egalitarian Age. But the direction of my disagreement is
important. I am challenging Nelson’s thesis from the perspective
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of someone who supports a return to the Rigorous Religion
Clause Model. I am not convinced that religious liberty and
equality can be adequately protected under a framework that
minimizes the distinctive nature of religion and allows for
substantial government funding of religious institutions. Nelson’s
response to my position in part is that we have moved too far
away from this old model for it to continue to provide a socially
coherent foundation for analyzing church-state disputes. I have
to acknowledge the power of that argument. I recognize how far
we have moved, and from my perspective how much we have lost,
over the last 30 years. I have been watching, lecturing and
writing with dismay as the church-state world of life and law has
changed for the worse over the last 30 years.
I do not believe, however, that 30 years of bad law and bad
policy requires us to choose between what I consider to be two
problematic approaches to church-state relationships. The Onesided Neutrality Model is not only problematic in its own right.
Its failing has a dynamic dimension to it. The shift to this model
substantially undermines the distinctive treatment of religion
and makes challenges to a robust, distinctive regime of religious
accommodations much more persuasive. The One-sided
Neutrality
Model’s
vulnerabilities
provoke
alternative
approaches that respond to its defects, but risk creating new and
different problems for religious liberty and anti-discrimination
values in doing so. Thus, the core question for me is not whether
a book like Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age can
effectively criticize the weaknesses of the One-sided Neutrality
Model. I think it can and does. The critical question is whether a
more comprehensively neutral alternative of the kind that
Nelson proposes can adequately promote and protect the multiple
values that are in play in church-state issues. I have questions
and concerns about an approach that generalizes religious liberty
protection to a more generic regime of associational freedom and
freedom of conscience. Those questions and concerns are the
primary focus of my review of Nelson’s book.
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III. THE AVOIDING HARMS PRINCIPLE AND THE UNFAIRNESS TO
OTHERS PRINCIPLE
Nelson identifies two core principles that operate to limit
the scope of religious exemptions or accommodations: the
avoiding harms principle35 and the unfairness to others
principle.36 These principles would apply to limit both
constitutionally grounded exemptions and discretionary
legislative accommodations. The Establishment Clause operates
to enforce the avoiding harms principle in appropriate
circumstances. The Establishment Clause arguably may have a
role to play in enforcing the unfairness to others principle as well
– although its applicability in this regard is less certain and the
circumstances in which it would operate to invalidate religious
exemptions would be more limited.37
A. The Avoiding Harms Principle
At a generic, broad, and abstract level, the harm or costs of
laws should be considered along with the exemption from the
laws, and benefits should not be examined separately from costs.
We should not look at benefits alone. We should also look at
costs. But Nelson makes a much more precise argument here. He
contends that religious liberty exemptions (whether recognized
by courts as a matter of constitutional law, created by specific
acts of legislative discretion, or required by a general religious
liberty statute such as RFRA) should be limited to those
situations in which the exemption does not cause unacceptable
harm to third parties. Here Nelson notes correctly that the
Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that the
Establishment Clause imposes constraints on religious
exemptions that favor certain faiths over other or that extend too
far by imposing undue burdens on non-beneficiaries.38

35 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 49—70.
36 Id. at 71—79.
37 Id. at 74—77 (discussing among other cases, the Court’s extension of conscientious

objector exemptions to include secular pacifists).
38 Id. at 55—56.
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I do not question Nelson’s basic argument that the
Establishment clause imposes some cap or limit on the scope of
religious accommodations because of the harm they cause to
third parties. I have two distinct concerns, however, about his
discussion of this principle. As a practical matter, I have
reservations about the way that Nelson describes the operational
methodology he endorses for determining when an exemption
goes too far and burdens third parties too much. As a conceptual
matter, I think the avoiding harm principle is more complicated
than Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age suggests.
B. Practical Problems with Applying the Avoiding Harms
Principle
The primary practical question about the avoiding harm
principle, as Nelson acknowledges, is determining when the
burden on third parties necessitates the invalidation of an
exemption on Establishment Clause grounds.39 While the
Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that some such limit exists,
it has provided very little guidance on how it should be identified.
The Court’s position here has been virtually all bark and no bite:
there is no coherent line of cases providing criteria or doctrine for
answering this question.40
Given the paucity of authority, a variety of answers might
be considered socially coherent as they would not directly
contradict an accepted line of authority. Nelson chooses as a
starting place for identifying unacceptable burdens,41 the
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines
v. Hardison 42, the case interpreting Title VII’s requirement that
employers must reasonably accommodate the religious practices
of their employees unless doing so would result in an undue
hardship to their business.43 Under the Court’s interpretation of
this statute anything more than a de minimis burden would
39 Id. at 60—61.
40 Nelson acknowledges that cases like Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints are inconsistent with the avoiding harms
principle. See TEBBE, supra note 1, at 56—57. I find it more difficult to reconcile this case
and others, such as Texas Monthly v. Bullock, than he does.
41 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 62.
42 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
43 Id. at 78-84.
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constitute an undue hardship and relieve the employer of any
duty to accommodate the religious needs of an employee.44
As I shall explain shortly, Nelson ultimately describes a
standard that is somewhat less draconian than this one for
determining
whether
religious
accommodations
are
constitutionally permissible. Yet it is difficult for me to
understand why he grounds his analysis in the Hardison decision
in the first place. Consider how dissenting Justices Marshall and
Brennan, strong supporters of both free exercise rights and
establishment clause constraints on the government’s promotion
of religion, described the majority opinion in Hardison:
“Today’s decision deals a fatal blow to all efforts under
Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious
practices. The Court holds, in essence, that although the EEOC
regulations and the Act state that an employer must make
reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take account of
religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really mean
what they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant
even the most minor special privilege to religious observers to
enable them to follow their faith. As a question of social policy,
this result is deeply troubling, for a society that truly values
religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions
to make the cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their
job. And as a matter of law today’s result is intolerable, for the
Court adopts the very position that Congress expressly rejected
in 1972, as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that
a majority of this Court thinks unwise. I therefore dissent.”45
I think it is fair to say that most advocates for religious
liberty condemn the Hardison standard for providing far too little
protection to employees who are members of minority faiths.46
Their arguments have increasingly received favorable responses.
California, for example, is a deep blue state. The Democratic
Party controls virtually all statewide offices and both houses of
the state legislature.47 Yet in 2012, California enacted the
44 Id. at 84.
45 Id. at 86—87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46 This is a personal observation, but I cannot recall ever speaking with a religious

liberty advocate who had anything positive to say about the Hardison decision.
47 California
State
Legislature,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_State_Legislature (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
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California Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) amending
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). FEHA
imposed a duty on employers to accommodate the religious
practices of employees that had been interpreted to parallel the
Hardison standard.48 As amended by WRFA, the de minimis
standard of the Hardison opinion was replaced with the
following, much more demanding language:
(u) “Undue hardship” means an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light
of the following factors:
(1) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
(2) The overall financial resources of the facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodations, the
number of persons employed at the facility, and the effect
on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise of these
accommodations upon the operation of the facility.
(3) The overall financial resources of the covered entity,
the overall size of the business of a covered entity with
respect to the number of employees, and the number, type,
and location of its facilities.
(4) The type of operations, including the composition,
structure, and functions of the workforce of the entity.
(5) The geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
relationship of the facility or facilities.49
Given the significant criticism and challenges directed at
the Hardison analysis as a statutory standard and the strong
legislative attempts to strengthen the duty of employers to
accommodate the religious practices of employees, I’m not at all
sure why it was necessary to look to Hardison as the basis for
determining
constitutional
constraints
on
religious
accommodations. This is particularly the case because Nelson
48 Rosanna Sattler & Laura Otenti, CA Workplace Religious Freedom Act, EMP. L.
STRATEGIST, http://www.pbl.com/uploads/23/doc/CA_Workplace_Religious.pdf (last visited
Sept. 8, 2017).
49 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(u) (Deering 1980).
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envisions a greater scope to permissible religious exemptions
than the literal language of Hardison would suggest. Nelson
explains that some lower courts in adjudicating accommodation
cases under Title VII have been engaged in a more thoughtful
inquiry of burdens on religion and costs to others.50 Even if most
courts adjudicating these cases do not engage in such an inquiry,
however, Nelson argues that the best understanding of the undue
hardship test and the standard he endorses for evaluating the
constitutionality of accommodations under the Establishment
Clause “involves a relational determination.”51 Some form of
balancing is required. “If the cost to others is slight in
comparison to the burden on religious freedom, courts [should
find the cost] to be de minimis”52 and, accordingly, the
accommodation should withstand Establishment clause review.
The question for courts is whether the costs of accommodations
“are relatively light compared to the interference with religious
freedom that the accommodation is designed to remedy.”53
A standard of review requiring courts to employ some kind
of a balancing test to determine when a religious accommodation
violates the Establishment Clause has much to commend it. I
remain uncertain, however, as to how Nelson envisions the
balancing test will work. His evaluation of the of the Court’s
reasoning in Hardison makes me uneasy. In discussing the
religious freedom side of the balance, I would have emphasized
that observing the Sabbath is considered to be a fundamental
obligation of many faiths. While I agree with Nelson that the cost
of the accommodation, another employee losing the opportunity
to take a weekend day off, is a real harm,54 in my judgment the
critical issue in these cases is what steps may be taken to reduce
this cost to an acceptable level. An employee required to work on
Saturday to accommodate a Sabbatarian might receive
preferences in vacation scheduling or overtime opportunities or
an increase in pay (offset perhaps by a reduction in the pay of the
accommodated employee) or a variety of other valued privileges

50
51
52
53
54

TEBBE, supra note 1, at 65—66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 63; Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, supra note 18, at 71.

BROWNSTEIN MACRO VERSION (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

6/12/2018 1:28 PM

89

to mitigate his loss. There may be situations where no such
alternatives are possible and the harm to other employees
justifies denying the accommodation. But I would not consider
the administrative convenience costs incurred by the employer in
mitigating those costs to be a sufficient justification for denying
the accommodation – unless the employer confronts truly
significant difficulty and expense in doing so.
If I am reading him Nelson correctly, I think he would put
a thumb on the Establishment Clause side of the balancing scale
in these cases. I worry about the weight of that thumb. And I
would put a thumb on the religious accommodation side of the
scale. From my perspective, the harm caused by a religious
exemption must be very substantial and not susceptible to being
mitigated or spread to bar the accommodation under the
Establishment Clause.
I am also uncertain as to whether Nelson would require
courts to extend any deference to the legislature’s conclusion that
on balance an accommodation was warranted. Consider the
California WRFA religious accommodation statute described
earlier. Would that law be subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge on its face under Nelson’s analysis because it requires
employers to incur serious costs before they can deny an
accommodation? Would any weight be assigned to the
legislature’s considered conclusion that this statutory standard
was necessary to protect religious minorities’ access to
employment and a livelihood?
Alternatively, the new California law might only be subject
to Establishment Clause challenge as applied. Courts would have
to consider the actual cost of the accommodation to the employer,
fellow employees, or other third parties and weigh it against the
importance of the employee’s religious liberty interests. In
considering that possibility I think it is important to confront a
core issue that a balancing test presents in these circumstances.
A primary reason why the Supreme Court concluded that free
exercise rights could not be protected against neutral laws of
general applicability in Employment Division v. Smith is that it
doubted the ability of federal courts to fairly and effectively
balance the state’s interest in refusing to exempt religious
individuals or institutions from general laws against the burdens
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the denial of an accommodation would impose on religious
freedom.55
The balancing test Nelson proposes would seem to assign a
very similar task to federal courts – although here courts are
asked to use a balancing analysis to determine whether the
Establishment Clause requires the invalidation of an
accommodation while in Smith courts had to use a balancing test
to determine whether the Free Exercise requires the adoption of
an accommodation. In either case, doubts about the subjectivity
and indeterminacy of such a balancing analysis require some
attention and discussion. Certainly one might ask this question:
if a balancing test may be reasonably and effectively employed
under the Establishment Clause to invalidate unacceptably
burdensome accommodations, is there any reason to continue to
support the Smith opinion’s argument that the balancing of
religious freedom and state interests is so difficult and
constitutionally improper that it requires dramatically limiting
the scope of free exercise rights?56
C. Conceptual Problems with the Avoiding Harms Principle
The conceptual problem with the avoiding the harms
principle is more complicated. Nelson recognizes there is an issue
here. He is working on resolving it. That is more than I can say
for myself. I am only flagging the issue because I was provoked
into thinking about it by reading Nelson’s manuscript.
The problem is the following: as a general matter, laws
often cause harm to individuals. And exemptions from laws do so
as well. Both religious and secular individuals are regularly
exposed to harm from laws and exemptions from laws designed to
further secular goals and beliefs. I take the following to be an
accepted principle of constitutional law. As a default principle,
laws or exemptions from laws do not violate the Constitution

55 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).
56 For a discussion of the similarity between the balancing required to determine if a

free exercise exemption would be required and the balancing involved in determining
whether a discretionary exemption goes too far and violates the Establishment Clause, see
Alan Brownstein, Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue, A Discussion of Justice Steven’s
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 605, 643—648
(2012).
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solely because the cause harm to, or impose costs on, third
parties who may not be directly benefited by the law.
Further, it is not just statutory law or the common law that
causes harm to third parties. Constitutional law does as well.
Courts will often protect the exercise of constitutional rights even
though doing so causes real harm to individuals. Rights are
expensive political goods. They require protection even when
there is a painful price for doing so. Freedom of speech is an
obvious example. Moreover, the harm caused by protecting
speech is not always spread broadly or equally. When the Nazis
march through Skokie, a community where many Jews and
Holocaust survivors reside; when a defamed victim’s reputation
is destroyed but he or she cannot satisfy the constitutional
standard for obtaining redress; when protestors rejoice in the
death of a soldier at the cemetery where parents are mournfully
burying their son or daughter, the exercise of rights causes
special harm to particular individuals. Thus, it seems to me that
there is a socially coherent foundation for recognizing that free
exercise mandated exemptions or discretionary legislative
accommodations, just like the protection provided to other rights,
may be justifiable even though they cause some real harm to
others.
Of course, there is an Establishment Clause in the First
Amendment and the courts have recognized that at some point
religious exemptions may extend too far and impose unacceptable
costs on third parties. When that occurs, the Establishment
Clause can be invoked to challenge the exemption.
Exactly why is that so? Since many secular laws, and
secular exemptions to their application, result in third party
harms without being subjected to serious constitutional review,
why does the Establishment Clause impose constraints on only
religious exemptions that cause harm to third parties? The
answer to this question, and Nelson makes this point, would
seem to be that there is something distinctively problematic as a
constitutional matter about people suffering harms as a result of
the state exempting religious individuals or institutions from
regulations that other individuals and institutions must obey.
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The government cannot require some people to incur costs in
order for other people to engage in religious exercise.57
This idea certainly has constitutional roots. It builds on the
contention that the religious liberty of taxpayers is impermissibly
burdened when the taxes they pay are used for religious worship,
proselytizing or instruction. It resonates with the Establishment
Clause doctrine restricting government subsidies of religious
institutions and activities. That doctrine has been undermined by
judicial decisions in recent years (I think incorrectly), but one can
certainly argue that it was long accepted and had an extended
pedigree.
If this is the foundation of the argument, however, more
needs to be done to connect it to the conclusion that religious
exemptions violate the Establishment Clause if they cause harm
to third parties. What happens, for example, if the state
generalizes the law to exempt both religious and secular acts of
conscience? (Nelson’s fairness principle, discussed later in his
book and in this review, seems to strongly endorse general
exemptions over religion specific exemptions.) Here, the harm to
third parties continues. Indeed, it increases in scope. A broader
harm causing exemption typically means that more people will
be harmed. Notwithstanding the increase in the extent of the
harm caused by the accommodation, does the fact that the
beneficiaries of the accommodation are both secular and religious
mean that the Establishment Clause limit on third party harms
no longer applies? That’s an arguable solution to the problem,
but would it be a preferred solution? More people would suffer
harm. Further, it is not even clear that a generalized neutral
exemption solves the constitutional concern about people not
having to incur costs in order to allow other people to engage in
religious exercise.
After all, even under a generalized exemption statute, it
may be clear that some, perhaps most, of the harmful conduct
permitted by the exemption will be engaged in for religious
purposes. If we were talking about the funding of religious
institutions, the case law enforcing strong Establishment Clause
constraints on subsidies to religious institutions held that the
generality of the funding scheme standing alone did not
57 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 52—54.
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immunize it from Establishment Clause review.58 One might
argue that a similar analysis should apply to exemptions so that
even if the exemption is generalized, there would still be a reason
to be concerned because some people would be harmed by
exempting a religious person or institution from an otherwise
generally applicable law?
This response suggests that even if the exemption is
generalized, the Establishment Clause should still operate to
protect people from harm caused by exempting religious
individuals or institutions from generally applicable laws. But
that solution also raises awkward questions. Would this mean
that the exemption has to be more limited for the religious
individual or institution than it is for the secular individual or
institution because only the former is subject to Establishment
Clause constraints? Because the concern about people incurring
costs to allow others to engage in religious exercise does not arise
when exemptions accommodate secular beliefs, the exemption for
secular individuals and institutions would not need to be
narrowed to reduce harm to third parties. Only the application of
the exemption for religious individuals and institutions is limited
by the Establishment Clause third party harm principle.
Still another alternative would suggest that Establishment
Clause constraints on exemptions accommodating both religious
and secular acts of conscience which result in third party harms
should apply across the board. The Constitution would preclude
the accommodation of conscience based on either religious or
secular beliefs if an exemption caused unacceptable harm to, or
imposed unacceptable costs on, third parties. This solution solves
some problems, but it leads to one important unanswered
question. Why should we have a constitutional framework that
accepts exemptions from laws for any number of reasons to
further a seemingly limitless range of state interests –
notwithstanding the harm these exemptions cause to third
parties – with only one exception: exemptions are
constitutionally impermissible if they are designed to respect and
protect the conscience of the individual?

58 See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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I do not claim to have an answer to these questions. I
believe they have not been addressed in case law and
commentary to any serious extent because Establishment Clause
cases invalidating accommodations on the grounds that they
impose unacceptable harm on third parties have been rare and
relatively anomalous. If a more demanding Establishment
Clause limit on accommodations was enforced by courts, these
questions would become more salient. I look forward to reading
Nelson’s future work addressing these issues.
D. The Unfairness to Others Principle
The unfairness to others principle can be stated simply. It
is unfair to grant religious individuals exemptions from laws
without providing a similar exemption to individuals with
comparably profound secular commitments that are burdened by
the laws’ requirements. Indeed, providing religious exemptions
exclusively in such situations is not only normatively unfair, it
denies nonreligious individuals the right to equal citizenship.59
I respect, but disagree, with much of Nelson’s analysis
here. Part of the problem is that I think there are persuasive
reasons for distinguishing religious exercise from other conduct
and beliefs. Nelson appears to me to be more ambivalent about
this distinction. But we are not going to resolve this issue in this
symposium – so let’s leave this disagreement aside for the
moment.
I also think that the distinctive nature of religion is more
generally accepted in our society than the idea that religion is
just another belief system. In my judgment, the idea that religion
is distinctive resonates to a greater extent with the conventions
of our jurisprudence than the view that religion is neither special
nor deserving of specific accommodations. There are hundreds of
religious accommodations in local, state and federal law, the
overwhelming majority of which apply on their face to religion
alone. Most notably, in addition to the First Amendment which
speaks of religion, not conscience, there is the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)60, numerous state RFRAs,61 the
59 See TEBBE, supra note 1, at 71—73.
60 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 §§ 2—7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb(4)

(2012).
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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA)62 which applies to both religious land use and the
religious exercise of inmates, and the exemption in Title VII for
religious organizations.63 Thus, I would argue that, at a
minimum, the principle that religious beliefs and practices
warrant special protection and exemptions is a socially coherent
summary of accepted legal and social mores.
I also am uncertain as to how courts can identify what
counts as a secular profound commitment that is comparable to
religion. I am inclined to agree with Andrew Koppelman’s
argument in his paper in this symposium64 and elsewhere65 that
there is simply no way to identify, protect and cabin the class of
all deeply valued human concerns.66 More importantly, I do not
view the recognition of particular liberty rights, but not others,
as denigrating individuals who value other protected interests. In
addition to religion, we recognize and provide special protection
and privileges to rights involving marriage, speech, family and
children, keeping and bearing firearms, and abortion.67
Relationships, activities, and identities outside of these
designated interests, however deeply felt and valued they may
be, are treated differently.68 The artist and author receive

61 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2017); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-761.061 (2017);
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02 (2017).
62 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act §§ 2-8, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc2000cc(5) (2012).
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012).
64 Andrew Koppelman, Tebbe and Reflective Equilibrium, 31 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON.
DEV. 125 (2018).
65 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY, 165 (2013).
66 Id. (“Because no single legal rule can protect all deeply valuable concerns, more
specific rules are necessary.”).
67 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (recognizing that
marriage is a protected right); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)
(recognizing that keeping and bearing firearms is a protected right); Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing that abortion is a
protected right); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(recognizing that family unity is a protected right); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213—14 (1972) (recognizing that religion is a protected right); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (recognizing that
speech is a protected right).
68 See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8—9 (1974) (determining that
the interest of family members in living together is a protected right, but the interest of
college roommates in living in the same dwelling is not).
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constitutional protection for their work.69 The craftsman whose
product is non-expressive does not.70 For some people, freedom of
speech is largely irrelevant to their lives. Protecting the land
they own and on which they base their livelihood and identity
might be a far more valued interest. Again, I largely agree with
Andrew Koppelman that assigning value to and protecting one
liberty interest does not insult or deny the value of other
interests.71
I do not mean to suggest that there are no circumstances in
which it seems to be normatively unfair to protect religious
exercise or religiously motivated conduct, but not to protect
similar secular practices or conduct motivated by secular beliefs.
In most such situations, however, I think the foundation of our
concern is not the difference in treatment. The problem is not
that religion is unfairly protected, it is that these other interests
arguably deserve constitutional or statutory recognition in their
own right. I am open to the argument that acts of secular
conscience or other secular commitments deserve to be
recognized and protected in appropriate circumstances; I make
no claim that the list of rights we currently recognize is finite
and exclusive. I do not agree, however, that because we recognize
some liberty rights, we are denying rights of equal citizenship to
individuals whose deepest values have not been recognized as
liberty rights.
Here again, however, I think it is important to understand
this disagreement about the fairness of religious exemptions in
terms of the three models I described at the beginning of this
book review.72
I look at religious exemptions from the
perspective of the Rigorous Religion Clause model, a
constitutional regime in which government support for religion is
sharply limited by Establishment Clause constraints on the
government’s funding of religious institutions. Those constraints,
69 See, e.g., Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)
(recognizing that even new mediums like video games are sufficiently expressive to be
protected speech under the First Amendment).
70 See, for example, the current debate about whether baking a wedding cake is
protected as speech in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD v. Civil Rights Comm. No. 16-1111,
Dec. 5, 2017, https://www. Supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
71 KOPPELMAN, supra note 65, at 165 (“Acknowledgment of the unique value of each
human good is no insult to the others.”).
72 See supra, notes 16—35 and accompanying text.
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standing alone, may seem unfair to religious individuals and
institutions; they certainly disadvantage religious groups in a
welfare state where government funding is so common. Under
this model, the Establishment Clause also imposes serious
constraints on the government’s ability to express religious
messages or promote religious ideas. No such constraint applies
to government support of secular messages or ideas. In this
complex
constitutional
regime,
restricting
government
interference with religion more aggressively and expansively
than we restrict government interference with secular beliefs and
conduct may not be generically unfair -- that is, it should not be
viewed as unfair when we take into account all of the situations
in which religion is treated less favorably than secular ideas and
institutions.
Of course, this macro argument will not alleviate fairness
concerns in every case in which an accommodation is limited to
religious exercise and does not extend to secular beliefs or beliefbased practices. Still I think there is some value to thinking
about offsetting benefits and burdens in discussing how the two
religion clauses fit together. The argument is most useful when
religion is being discussed as a generic perspective or belief
system and compared to equally generic secular perspectives and
beliefs -- which is what Nelson does in the principles section of
his book.73
This quid pro quo analysis is far less precise when we are
talking about particular faiths. However, I think there is still
some utility to it. For example, many minority faiths are
protected by free exercise rights, but are also burdened by
Establishment Clause constraints on their ability to receive state
support for religious institutions.74 Orthodox Jews, for example,
could be (and should have been) protected by a rigorous free
exercise doctrine that granted them exemptions from Sunday
closing laws. They would also argue that they are substantially
burdened by “no aid” doctrine that prohibited government
support for their Jewish day schools. Similarly, some minority
faiths would benefit from religious accommodations, but feel
73 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 49.
74 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (finding that state funding

religious school teachers’ salaries violates the Establishment Clause).
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burdened by constitutional constraints on religious displays,
contending that such restrictions secularize society and
undermine their religious messages.
Indeed, because of the diversity of beliefs in American
society, many faiths are powerful in some jurisdictions and weak
in others. If we think about state and local decision-making, the
Mormons, for example, are limited by the Establishment Clause
in Utah where they have the political power to be an established
religion, but they are minorities seeking free exercise protection
in other jurisdictions, such as California. Even a very large faith
such as Catholicism -- which can certainly claim to be burdened
by Establishment Clause constraints on government funding and
other limitations on the government promotion of religion -- finds
itself needing free exercise protection when some of its beliefs
conflict with important secular ideals.75
From the perspective of the Limited Liberty Equality
Model, which serves as the general foundation of Religious
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, all of this analysis misses the
mark.
It is grounded in a jurisprudence that has been
repudiated by the Court and rejected by most church-state
scholars as well. There is little utility or social coherence for that
matter in taking Establishment Clause constraints on the
government’s promotion of religion into account in evaluating the
fairness of religious accommodations when those constraints no
longer exist. As I indicated in the beginning of this review, there
is considerable force to this position. Nonetheless, I believe it is
important to understand the limits of the competing dominant
models in contemporary jurisprudence. Focusing on the Rigorous
Religion Clause model provides what I think is needed
perspective to understand that the choices we confront today are
not intrinsic to United States church-state doctrine.
Finally, I challenge Nelson’s argument that denying
religious individuals or institutions exemptions from neutral
laws of general applicability does not subordinate them, deny
them equal citizenship, or cause them non-endorsement harms.76
If the experience of the religious group or individual denied an
75 See, e.g,. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73—
74 (Cal. 2004). See generally Zubic v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)
76 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 117—119.
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exemption or accommodation is relevant to the analysis as an
empirical matter (I think it is, I’m not sure if Nelson does) then I
think that religious individuals that are denied exemptions often
feel disrespected and subordinated. Interests that are critically
important to their identities and core beliefs are ignored and
treated as if they are valueless and unworthy of recognition.77
Moreover, I think there is a powerful, socially coherent argument
that supports the idea of non-endorsement and disrespect in
these cases.
We live in a society where exemptions from laws are
commonplace. Legislation is often drafted along the contours of
interest groups that lobby and use their political influence to
skew the parameters of laws. Often, the interests that influence
legislative decisions may seem unimportant and undeserving of
attention to neutral observers. Compromises in legislation are a
statement about which groups count in our society. Further, if we
focus on religion, in most cases laws are drafted to avoid the
burdening of large, politically-powerfuI faiths.78 If the contours
of the law circumscribe the practices of religious majorities,
exemptions are unnecessary. With that understanding as a
foundation for evaluating the message communicated by
government conduct, denying religious exemptions may certainly
be characterized as communicating a message of subordination
and disrespect.79
IV. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND EXEMPTIONS FROM CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWS PROHIBITING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Nelson’s analysis of freedom of association and its impact
on laws prohibiting employment discrimination is thoughtful,
nuanced and complicated. This makes it difficult to summarize
and discuss his analysis in a relatively brief essay such as this
one. Accordingly, I am going to focus on a few core ideas.
Nelson breaks down private associations into three
categories:

77 See Brownstein, Continuing the Constitutional Dialogue, A Discussion of Justice
Steven’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, supra note 56, at 631-56..
78 Id. at 632-33. .
79 Id. at 631—36.
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1. Intimate associations. The classic example of an intimate
association is the family. Indeed, it is not clear to me that
anything other than familial relationships are included in
this category in Nelson’s association cosmology. We
protect these associations because they are basic to
personhood – to the self-defining identity of a person.
Constitutional law provides maximum protection to
intimate associations against anti-discrimination laws.80
2. Close and contained associations. These are defined as
local organizations that are limited in size. They are
critically important organizations because of the role they
play in value formation among their members. These
associations are incubators of views on fundamental
questions of personal and public morality. Associations do
not qualify to be included in this category if they are too
large or are not tightly knit.81
3. Values organizations. These associations are regional and
national in size. They are primarily important because
they express independent voices in the marketplace of
ideas.82
As to all of these associations, Nelson suggests that there is
generally no socially coherent or persuasive reason to treat
religious groups differently than secular groups.83 Intimate
associations, as well as close and contained associations should
be allowed to choose their members and leaders without the
constraints of anti-discrimination laws. Values organizations
should be shielded from anti-discrimination laws in the selection
of their leaders or speakers but only to the extent that doing so is
required by their ideological commitments and mission.84
The analysis changes to some extent if we shift from an
association’s decisions regarding membership and leaders to an
association’s decisions regarding employment. Intimate

80
81
82
83
84

TEBBE, supra note 1, at 82.
Id. at 83—85.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 88—96.
Id.
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associations’ constitutional protection does not extend to
employment, such as the hiring of baby sitters or a clerk at a
Mom and Pop store, but civil rights laws often exclude small
business operations from their coverage in any case.85
For discrimination in employment purposes, close and
contained local community associations can hire employees in
leadership positions free from civil rights laws. As to other
employees, these associations can discriminate on the basis of
belief or ideology pretty much across the board, but they cannot
discriminate in hiring on other grounds.86
With regard to values organizations, policy makers and
communicators can be hired and fired free from the constraints of
civil rights laws, but only for reasons that are required by their
mission or ideology. Also, employees whose work is connected to
the formation or implementation of the group’s mission can be
subject to belief discrimination and perhaps other kinds of
discrimination as well.87
I think there are problems with the way these categories
are defined by function. For example, the line between close
associations that are important because of the role they play in
value formation and larger values associations that are
important because they express independent voices in the
marketplace of ideas seems somewhat arbitrary.
Larger
organizations may play an important role in value formation as
well as the dissemination of ideas. It is not uncommon for a
national religious association, such as a mainline Protestant
denomination, for example, to decide the values the
denomination will espouse on controversial issues such as the
denomination’s position on homosexual relationships and samesex marriage through a national discussion among the
representatives of local congregations. That seems to me to be
value formation at the national level. Local congregations
categorized as close associations, on the other hand, frequently
add their independent voice to the local marketplace of ideas.
However, it is probably the case that no manageable category
scheme for associations can avoid some arbitrary line drawing.
85 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 146-47.
86 Id. at 147—48.
87 Id. at 148.
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Some imprecision in defining categories is simply the price of
working with a limited number of categories.
My primary concerns with Nelson’s freedom of association
analysis go to more fundamental matters. To begin with, I
believe that there is a powerful and persuasive socially coherent
argument for treating religious associations and institutions
differently than their secular counterparts.
Looking at the way the law operates, it seems clear to me
that the distinction between the religious and the secular is
pervasive in our society and legal system. Specific religious
accommodations are hardly uncommon and there are numerous
notable examples of constitutional and statutory law
distinguishing between religious and secular institutions. The
ministerial exception applies only to religious congregations.88
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, but not
discrimination on the basis of secular belief or identity. Title VII
only exempts religious organizations from the prohibition against
religious discrimination.89 RLUIPA only applies to religious land
uses. Obviously, the beneficiaries of the land use provisions of
this federal law are religious associations. Federal RFRA and
numerous state RFRA’s also apply exclusively to religious
associations and institutions as well as religious individuals.
Thus, I think some distinction between religious and secular
associations and institutions is accepted and settled in our legal
system.
I think there are several justifications for this distinction.
First, there is a sense in which a religious congregation overlaps
all three of the different associations that Nelson describes.
Religious congregations connect with family life more than any
other kind of association in our society. Religion relates to
marriage, procreation, child rearing, life cycle changes, and the
death of family members. For devoutly religious people, religion
is an intrinsic part of their family association. Religious
congregations are obviously involved in value formation and the
transmission of values within the religious community. Religious
associations also have a voice in the market place of ideas. While
88 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694,
705—06 (2012).
89 See generally Spencer v. World Vision, 633 F. 3d 723 (9th Cir. 2011).
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national or regional religious associations may be speakers and
idea communicators at the state or national level, religious
congregations have a voice at the local level. I doubt that any
secular association can demonstrate the depth and breadth of
religious associations across these categorical lines.
Second, many Americans believe in the concept that
certain conduct, places, and purposes are holy or sacred. A house
of worship and related facilities is a sanctuary – a sacred place.
Funds donated to religious associations are reserved for sacred
purposes. Even if a church allows a third party to use its multipurpose facility for a non-denominational purpose, there is an
understanding that the use of space must be consistent with the
sacred nature of the location. Similarly, if a religious
congregation hires staff using funds that were donated to it for
denominational purposes, the congregation should be able to
require that employees hired support it’s beliefs and mission.
Third, courts are sensitive and rightly so to legal standards
that require treating certain religions differently than others.
The parameters of the close, contained, and tightly knit
association that Nelson envisions seem indeterminate. If there is
no special rule for religious congregations, one must assume that
some congregations are insufficiently close or tightly knit to fall
within the category. Similarly, some discriminatory decisions by
religious values organizations may be deemed necessary to the
organization’s mission while discriminatory decisions by other
religious organizations may be determined to be inadequately
connected to the organization’s mission.90 A legal framework that
results in certain religious associations being permitted to
discriminate while other, similar, religious organizations are
denied such exemptions undermines our commitment to religious
neutrality.
Fourth, religious institutions operate under Establishment
Clause constraints. These institutions may be ineligible for

90 The primary reason Justice Brennan concurred in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987) to uphold the broad
exemption from Title VII which permitted religious organizations to discriminate on the
basis of religion in hiring staff was that he doubted the ability of courts and juries to
accurately determine what constituted a religious function for minority faiths. Id. at
2872—73 (Brennan, J., concurring). One might be equally concerned about judicial
discretion in determining what is required by a religious association’s mission.
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government aid that their secular counterparts receive. The
government may provide expressive support for the mission of
secular associations, but cannot provide similar encouragement
to religious groups. Given the Establishment Clause limitations
that religious institutions operate under, one might argue that
distinctive associational freedom for religious organizations
works to even the playing field to some extent.
I understand that Nelson is unpersuaded by my argument
that religious organizations are distinctive because their
autonomy and protection implicates each of the three
constitutional values that underlie his categorical framework:
intimate association, value formation, and the dissemination of
independent voices in the market place of ideas. But I am not
sure why. I think that a values based analysis of church-state
issues, which recognizes that multiple values are in play,
demands that we look to the accumulation of values and interests
on both sides of conflicts, in order to resolve problems and
ultimately develop doctrine. If a rule of decision, such as
protecting the autonomy of religious associations, furthers more
of the values we consider relevant and important to associational
freedom, I think that rule is independently and distinctly
justifiable compared to other rules of decision that further more
limited values.
I also recognize that the forth distinction has limited
applicability in light of the current Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. This contention is one of the places where I am
arguing from a Rigorous Religion clause model while Nelson’s
analysis is grounded, in many ways quite reasonably, in more
contemporary religion clause jurisprudence. If we are limited by
the parameters of current religion clause doctrine to a conflict
between the One-Sided Neutrality Model and the Limited
Liberty, Equalitarian Model, there is considerable persuasive
force to Nelson’s analysis calling for the equalizing of the
associational freedom of religious and secular associations.
My arguments about the distinctive nature of religion and
the special justifications for protecting religious associational
autonomy clash with a church-state jurisprudence that insists
that there is nothing distinctive about religious organizations
and that, accordingly, religious organizations should receive
government financial support on the same terms as secular
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organizations. My arguments clash with the reality that religious
organizations which claim a special autonomy right to operate
independently from government will also be receiving substantial
government funds – funds which are being provided to the
religious organization to serve the public good as that good is
determined by the state officials who authorize and review such
subsidies. My arguments about the special nature and status of
religious beliefs and identity clash with a jurisprudence that
permits government to influence individual and collective
religious beliefs through its power to sponsor and express
religious displays, sectarian messages, and directed prayers in
government meetings and activities.
Perhaps, most importantly, my arguments must confront
the reality that autonomy and freedom from state regulatory
interference in determining an association’s members and hiring
its staff is empowering. Having distinctive autonomy protection
provides associations with expressive missions a valuable
competitive advantage in the market place of ideas. It gives
religious voices a stronger and less encumbered foundation that
their secular counterparts.91 Who would doubt that a legal
framework providing left wing organizations distinctive
autonomy protection and freedom from regulations unavailable
to right wing organizations distorted the marketplace of ideas?
How then, if all else is equal with regard to government support
and promotion of religious and secular organizations in funding
and government speech, can we justify providing religious
associations valuable freedoms that are not available to their
secular counterparts?
Let us put these establishment clause concerns aside, at
least for the moment. My intuitive discomfort with Nelson’s
framework for resolving associational freedom issues and
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws goes beyond my
contention that the nature of religious associations justifies
providing them distinctive protection. I also worry that Nelson’s
approach creates serious risks that an analysis which
distinguishes between religious and secular associations is more
91 See Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 17, at 271—74; see
also Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates, supra note 19
at 1714.
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likely to avoid. Basically, Nelson urges us to expand the scope of
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws for secular associations
– particularly for close associations. Under his thesis, such
associations can discriminate against anyone in choosing
members and can discriminate on the basis of religion or secular
belief in hiring staff. What is critical here is that religious
congregations receive no special associational protection because
they are religious. At the local level, they would only receive
protection against anti-discrimination laws if they qualify as a
close association.
Initially that analysis seemed to me to locate conflicts
between religious liberty and anti-discrimination laws
somewhere between the proverbial rock and a hard place. On the
one hand, I worried that under Nelson’s analysis we would define
close associations so narrowly we would end up not protecting a
lot of religious congregations against anti-discrimination laws.
On the other hand, I thought if close associations were defined
more broadly to include all or virtually all religious
congregations, we would end up protecting a very large number
of local associations against civil rights laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of religion – and perhaps on the basis
of other protected identities as well.
I recognize that determining the scope of associational
freedom and the resolution of conflicts between associational
freedom and anti-discrimination laws is a difficult undertaking.
And this is particularly so when we are discussing close
associations. There is a perilous Catch 22 here. These are
associations that play a critically important role in the formation
of values in our society. These associations are incubators of the
society’s and polity’s views on fundamental questions of personal
and public morality. Thus, there is a powerful case to be made for
extending substantial protection to these associations against
government interference with their membership and hiring
decisions. If we define freedom of association expansively,
however, these values will be formed and fundamental questions
answered in associations where racial minorities and women are
not members and Jews and Moslems cannot even be hired as
employees. It is in the nature of rights that they are expensive
political goods, but this is surely a very high price to pay, both for
excluded individuals and groups and for society as a whole.
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While conceding the difficulty of the project, I remain
unconvinced that a neutral and generic approach to associational
freedom is preferable to an analysis that distinguishes between
religious and secular associations and provides distinctive
protection for religious institutional autonomy. In e-mail
correspondence with Nelson after the conference, he made it
clear that the close association category was intended to include
all local religious congregations with the possible exception of
mega-churches. That clarification alleviates my concern about
the rock – about religious congregations falling outside the
category and receiving inadequate protection. However, it does
not reduce my misgivings about the hard place – the risk that
this analysis substantially expands the scope of exemptions from
anti-discrimination laws.
The picture presented by this approach in small town
America may be particularly bleak. Here, there may be an
insufficient number of minority group residents to organize many
associations of their own. Minorities may be systematically shut
out of the public life of the community by being denied
membership in all of the private associations in which social,
political, and economic bonds are developed. Size is relative. A
club with 50 members may monopolize life in a small town while
a club with 350 members may be a drop in the bucket of
associational choices in New York City.
Nelson does not believe his framework risks this result. He
certainly does not intend for it to require these consequences.
The definition of close associations, however, is sufficiently
indeterminate that it is difficult to know exactly how these
exemptions from civil rights laws would apply. Nelson relies on
case law defining a bona fide private club to provide working
guidelines for defining a close association.92 I confess that I have
not studied this line of authority closely. I’m not sure whether it
focuses on value formation which is the defining characteristic of
close associations under Nelson’s framework.
More importantly, I don’t think the courts developing and
applying these criteria to private clubs thought that they were
also developing doctrine which would determine whether a
religious congregation would be exempt from anti-discrimination
92 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 90—91.
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laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion. The
criteria for identifying a protected association might have been
broadened considerably, if courts recognized that this would be
the only basis for protecting the associational autonomy of
religious congregations and organizations.
Let’s consider the synagogue I attend as an example to
illustrate the problem. I live in Davis, California. It is a college
town of about 30,000 students and 30,000 non-student residents.
The membership of my synagogue, Congregation Bet Haverim, is
about 275 families. That’s fairly large for a small town, but other
religious congregations in Davis are even larger. We are very
non-selective in accepting members. You have to be Jewish, but
that’s about it and we don’t inquire very much about why you
think you are Jewish. A lot of houses of worship in Davis are like
that. If a person asserts that he or she accepts the doctrines of
the faith, they are accepted as a member. No other qualifications
for membership are required.
If religious congregations such as Bet Haverim will be
recognized as a close association, not because it is a religious
association, but because of its generic characteristics, then I
assume that other associations of similar size, and a similar level
of selectivity, would also, necessarily, have a strong case that
they qualify as a close association. We would also take into
account the key purpose for protecting close associations –
independent value formation.93 That is certainly true for a
synagogue or other house of worship. Presumably, other
associations that satisfy the size and selectivity criteria and also
are involved in value formation would be very strong candidates
for inclusion in the close association category.
If my synagogue satisfies the criteria for identifying a close
association, arguably a great many other local associations fit
these criteria as well. Consider local youth programs such as the
Little League or AYSO (soccer league). I think the Little League
is far more selective than my synagogue. It discriminates on the
basis of age, geography, and gender.94 It also claims to be focused
93 Id. at 84 (“[I]dentifying groups that qualify for this sort of First Amendment
protection ought not to be a formalistic exercise; rather, it should always relate back to
the purposes for protecting community groups in a democratic society.”).
94 See David Fintz, The Women’s Right To Participate In The Game Of Baseball,15
CARDOZO J.L & GENDER 641, 652 (2009).
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on value formation: the values of perseverance, teamwork,
sportsmanship etc. Suppose in a particular town, the local Little
League decided to exclude Muslims because it argued that Islam
was inconsistent with the association’s ideals about
sportsmanship and teamwork. Then it would even be more
selective. If a religious congregation is a close association, all
youth programs similar to the Little League are as well and
exemptions for these organizations from anti-discrimination laws
would be required. Nelson tentatively agrees that under his
analysis these youth organizations are close associations.
By analogy, I thought that small county bar associations
would also be close associations. They do not have official
responsibilities or authority like the State Bar in California.
They are completely voluntary. They are limited by profession
and geography. They are very involved with legal ethics and
value formation. Moreover, there are numerous other “bar
associations” that identify with particular groups of lawyers: the
Hispanic bar association, the Asian Pacific bar association, a
Jewish bar association. There are other legal associations that do
not call themselves bar associations: the Women’s Lawyers
Association or the Christian Legal Society. And then there is the
Inn of Court which is very selective of individual members.
All of these groups are involved with value formation to
some degree (some more than others). Are these close
associations? If they limited their membership or leadership
positions to Hispanics, women, Christians etc., they would be as
or more selective than my synagogue. Would they be protected
against some anti-discrimination laws? The membership of all of
these associations practice a particular profession and to that
extent there is an economic dimension to their identity. Nelson
argues that this would preclude them from being recognized as a
close association. I am not sure why this should be the case. No
one would mistake the Christian Legal Society or an Inn of Court
Chapter for a trade association. Further, very selective private
clubs may limit their membership to professionals, e.g., doctors,
lawyers, and successful businessmen and women etc. Local
plumbers or high school teachers need not apply. If these clubs
are close associations even though they limit their membership to
a range of professionals, it is not clear to me why an association
comprised of members of a particular profession is not a close
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association as well. Certainly, I would think far more value
formation activities occur at an Inn of Court or Christian Legal
Society meeting than at a restricted athletic club.
I also thought that parent organizations such as the PTA
might be a close association. In Davis, they are divided by school,
and the elementary schools are not that large. I do not know
whether they are formally limited to the parents of children
attending a particular school or if that is just the general custom,
but suppose membership in each chapter is limited to the parents
of children attending a particular school. A school PTA in Davis
is usually much smaller than my congregation. Would that make
it a close association compared to a religious congregation? PTA’s
are very involved in value formation. Leaving aside the question
of whether discriminatory policies would be acceptable to the
national parent organization, if a group organized and identified
itself as the Women’s PTA for X school on the theory that raising
kids is a woman’s job, would it be permitted to exclude male
parents? Would a Christian PTA chapter be a close association
permitted to exclude Jewish and Muslim parents?
Nelson suggests that a PTA chapter would not be a close
association, but again I am not sure why this must be so. Surely
parents of a particular faith whose children attend the same
public school could create a private association to address school
concerns from the perspective of their faith. If they discovered
that this group included many of the members of the school’s
PTA, why would they not be permitted to reconstitute themselves
as the Protestant PTA of X school?
I thought neighborhood associations might also be
sufficiently small and selective to constitute a close association.
Neighborhood definitions and boundaries are arbitrary. A group
may define the “neighborhood” in ways that include residents of
certain races and economic classes and exclude residents who live
a couple of blocks away because they are poorer or ethnically
different. There is no rule defining the boundaries of
neighborhood associations. The boundaries are defined by the
members who start the association. Or think of an ethnic
neighborhood association such as a “Chinatown” neighborhood
association. There are no fixed limits to what constitutes
“Chinatown” in a city. Such an association may draw boundary
lines based on the ethnicity of residents. These neighborhood
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associations may be larger or smaller than my synagogue. To the
extent that they promote the cultural values of a particular
ethnic community, they would seem to be involved in value
formation.
From my various post conference discussions with Nelson,
I think he envisions the operation of his generic associational
freedom framework to protect virtually all religious
congregations and houses of worship as close associations. But it
would not protect discriminatory decisions by so many other
associations that religious minorities, and in some circumstances
other minorities as well, could be effectively excluded from much
of the public life of a community. I need to have a better
understanding of how the framework he endorses can accomplish
this goal.
American society intuitively recognizes that religious
groups, notwithstanding all of the good that they do for their own
members and the community at large, are intrinsically
exclusionary. That intuition, I suggest, is not so commonly
accepted for other kinds of associations in our society. The fact
that the exclusionary nature of religious associations is
recognized to be distinctive and deserving of greater protection
from the mandates of civil rights laws than secular associations
may be a valuable working arrangement that maximizes both
religious liberty and anti-discrimination principles. While our
communities wrestle with the extent to which we should
accommodate
religious
exemptions
from
civil
rights
requirements, we need to keep our eye on our ultimate goals. A
legal regime which provides less distinctive protection to
religious liberty while allowing more discrimination against
minorities by secular organizations may not be the best solution
to the admittedly difficult conflict between liberty and equality
interests that we are confronting today.
V. THE SOCIALLY COHERENT ANALOGY TO IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
One final issue regarding employment discrimination is
very difficult to resolve, but I think it needs to be addressed.
Nelson argues with considerable persuasive force that
exemptions from civil rights laws for religious organizations, like
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the exemption in Title VII from the prohibition against religious
discrimination in hiring, are limited to belief or ideological
discrimination. Religious organizations cannot discriminate
against any of the groups recognized in Title VII and protected as
to their identity, such as racial minorities or women.95 In this
sense, Nelson suggests that religious organizations are being
treated just like secular organizations. An environmental
organization, for example, is permitted to discriminate against
non-environmentalists in hiring staff. Similarly, religious
organizations can discriminate in hiring in favor of members of
their own faith. Thus, both religious and secular organizations
can discriminate on the basis of a job applicant’s beliefs, but not
other prohibited grounds, without violating civil rights laws.96
I think this analysis is too summary in its characterization
of the operation of civil rights laws and the exemption provided
for religious organizations. We do not protect religious
individuals against discrimination on the basis of religion in civil
rights statutes because we are trying to protect the liberty right
to hold religious beliefs or limit employers from engaging in belief
(or ideological) discrimination. We include religion as a protected
class in civil rights statutes like Title VII because we believe
religion is an identity, just like race and sex describe a person’s
identity.97 We prohibit discrimination in hiring on the basis of
religion because religion describes who a person is, not what they
do or say or believe.98
Accordingly, when we allow religious organizations to
discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring, we are permitting
those organizations to discriminate against the members of a
protected class defined by its members’ identity. Secular
organizations receive no similar exemption. They are not
permitted to discriminate against job applicants based on the
person’s identity if that identity is recognized as defining a
protected class. Non-environmentalists are not recognized as
having a distinctive identity nor are they members of a protected
95 TEBBE, supra note 1, at 89, 91—92.
96 Id. at 95—96.
97 See William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society and Speech-Based Claims

for Religious Exemptions from Neutral laws of General Applicability, 32 CARDOZO L REV.
1937, 1939—42 (2011).
98 Id.
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class. The law treats such individuals as people who hold
particular beliefs, not as people who have a distinct identity.99
Further, the law does not recognize the need to protect people
who hold such beliefs from discrimination in hiring. The
foundation of class prejudice and discrimination which civil
rights laws are designed to challenge simply does not apply to
people whose beliefs are in some way insufficiently proenvironment.
Conceptualized in this way, we confront a more difficult
question when we try to explain why a religious organization, say
a Protestant denomination, can discriminate against Muslims or
Jews, but not women or African-Americans. In both
circumstances, the religious organization may claim that
discrimination is required by the tenets of its faith and in both
cases it is discriminating against the members of a protected
class based on their religious, racial, or sexual identity.
The answer to that question, whatever it is, will be
relevant to any discussion of exemptions for religious
organizations from civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. We will have to decide whether
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is more like
discrimination on the basis of religion – for which an exemption
is granted to religious organizations – or whether it is more like
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or national ancestry
where exemptions from employment discrimination laws are
generally denied.
A social coherence analysis is based in considerable part on
reasoning by analogy. The question we need to answer here
requires us to determine what would be the most persuasive
analogy for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. I
have spent some time trying to think through the answer to this
question,100 and I suggest it is not susceptible to an easy and
obvious answer.

99 Id. at 1941.
100 Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case

for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to
Marry, 45 U.S.F.L REV. 389 (2010).

